The nearly four-year-long war in Ukraine may be coming to an end; decisive elections are approaching in Hungary and several neighbouring countries; and an unprecedented internal crisis accompanies Bulgaria’s accession to the euro. From a political perspective, 2026 promises to be a turbulent year in Central and Eastern Europe. In this article, we review the five most important expected events, their background, and their consequences.
1) Peace Without Ukraine? – The Possible Conclusion of the Russian-Ukrainian War
In 2026, there may be an opportunity to end the war in Ukraine; however, it is conceivable that this will occur against the will of the leadership in Kyiv, as a result of great-power bargains. By 2025, the front lines have dug in, Western supporters are increasingly fatigued, and the new leadership of the United States is pushing for a rapid settlement. A leaked U.S.-Russian peace plan has surfaced that essentially reflects the Kremlin’s demands, in a manner unacceptable to Ukraine (for example, it includes the handover of the Donbas and limitations on the Ukrainian armed forces). President Volodymyr Zelensky has openly opposed such “peace offers,” but if the West withdraws its support, he may have no other choice. A forced peace would represent a painful loss for Ukraine, but a geopolitical triumph for Russia. In Central Europe, there are fears that such a settlement would set a dangerous precedent. The manner in which the war is concluded may therefore also determine the region's future security.
2) A Tight Race in Hungary – The Duel Between Viktor Orbán and Péter Magyar
In April 2026, Hungary will hold parliamentary elections, which promise to be an extremely close contest between the long-governing Fidesz party and the opposition’s party founded last year, Respect and Freedom (TISZA). Prime Minister Viktor Orbán has led the country for more than 16 years, yet for the first time, there is a real chance that his challenger, Péter Magyar, could unseat him. Although most polls predict a victory for Magyar, some surveys have also shown a lead for Fidesz. In his campaign, Orbán emphasises stability and security, claiming that his opponents would plunge the country into chaos in uncertain times. Péter Magyar, by contrast, calls for a change of government and a liberal European reorientation, promising to restore the rule of law. The stakes are enormous: if Orbán remains in power, the current course and the confrontational relationship with Brussels will continue, in an increasingly rightward-shifting Europe; if, however, TISZA wins, an opposition cabinet could be formed for the first time in a decade and a half, yet paradoxically Hungary could find itself outside the political discourse due to the unprecedented weakening of Europe’s mainstream parties. In the latter case, cooperation with the European Commission would likely improve, and previously frozen EU funds would be unlocked; at the same time, however, the new leadership would face severe difficulties on the international stage without genuine political allies, relying on the support of an unprecedentedly weak Commission and European People’s Party. In any case, in 2026, for the first time in a long while, it is genuinely an open question who will lead Hungary.
3) Bulgaria and the Euro – Accession Against a Crisis-Ridden Backdrop
Bulgaria officially introduced the euro on January 1, 2026, but a severe domestic political and economic crisis overshadows this milestone. A significant portion of the population distrusts the transition, fearing rising prices – not without reason, as the prices of several basic goods did indeed spike in the first weeks. Meanwhile, at the end of 2025, mass protests erupted in Sofia over the cost-of-living crisis and government corruption, bringing down the coalition government. In the spring of 2026, yet another parliamentary election will be held – the eighth since 2021. Years of political instability, combined with the challenges of fresh eurozone membership, pose a serious risk. Experts fear that if Bulgaria fails to regain control of the situation quickly and a stable government does not emerge, the crisis could spill over into the entire eurozone. In extreme cases, EU financial assistance may also be required to avoid a “second Greece” scenario. Thus, in 2026, Europe’s leaders will closely monitor whether Bulgaria can consolidate its internal situation and whether the introduction of the euro truly becomes a success story of integration.
4) A Right-Wing Shift in Slovenia – The SDS’s Return to Power Looks Likely
In Slovenia, parliamentary elections will be held on March 22, 2026, in which the right-wing opposition is likely to come to power. The Slovenian Democratic Party (SDS), led by Janez Janša, is at the top of opinion polls, ahead of the incumbent Prime Minister Robert Golob's party. Janša – a close ally of Viktor Orbán who has previously served as prime minister three times – openly espouses Eurosceptic and anti-immigration views, while the Golob government elected in 2022 supports liberal reforms. After four years, many Slovenian voters are disappointed with the government and would welcome Janša’s return to power. If the SDS wins, Slovenia’s politics are expected to shift to the right: the government would move closer to the Hungarian-Czech axis within the EU, and a conservative turn could come in areas such as media policy or the independence of the judiciary. If, however, Golob unexpectedly remains in power, it would signal that Slovenian society continues to reject the illiberal wave. This election is therefore also about whether Slovenia joins the national-conservative trend observable in the region, or remains committed to a mainstream/liberal orientation.
5) A Baltic Turnaround? – What Is at Stake in Latvia’s Parliamentary Election
Among the Baltic states, Latvia will hold parliamentary elections in 2026, and the outcome may shape the political direction of the entire region. Since the start of the war in Ukraine, Latvia has pursued one of the hardest anti-Moscow policies: it strongly supports Ukraine and has curbed Russian influence at home through strict measures. At the same time, a quarter of the country’s population is Russian-speaking, and their political representation has weakened. Moderate pro-Russian parties were voted out of parliament at the last election, and a radical, NATO-opposing movement took their place. At present, a pro-Western coalition governs in Riga, but society is divided over the burdens of the war and minority-related tensions. The 2026 election may show whether Latvia – and, more broadly, the Baltics – will persist with a hardline Russia policy, or whether populist, more conciliatory voices gain ground. If the governing forces prevail, the Baltic countries' unified stance toward Moscow will remain unchanged. If, however, the ballots deliver a surprise result and strengthen the support for Russian speakers, the region’s politics may become more nuanced. Across Europe, close attention will be paid to what direction the Riga vote sets for the future of the post-war Baltic region.